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SUpply Management Options: National Impact am. Policy 
SUpply management for the U.S. milk industry -
What is it? 
Why are we interested in it? 
What are the objectives of supply management? 
What are the pros and cons of supply management? 
Where do we stand in terms of adopting a supply management program? 
One of the problems in talking about dairy supply management is that 
everybody seems to have their am individual idea of what it means. I have 
talked with milk producers who had been on a base plan in their Federal order 
market thirty years ago, and that historic version of a base plan to them is 
supply management. Let's start by finding sane camoon terminology. 
SUpply management can be defined as being a national program, authorized 
by Federal legislation, designed to use production control regulations rather 
than price to match the supply of milk with the demand for milk. 
Historically, the milk industry has used price to match the supply of milk 
with the demand for milk. Even with the passage of the dairy price support 
program in the Agricultural Act of 1949, the criterion for adjusting support 
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prices each marketing year was geared to a supply - demand factor, i.e., 'in 
the ~of 75 to 90 percent of parity in order to assure an adequate supply.' 
For example, support prices were actually dropped five different times in the 
1950's an:l 1960's by the Secretary to manage supply relative to demand. Milk 
surpluses in the 1949-1978 period averaged 4.2 percent (milk equivalent basis) 
annually, far short of the accumulations M! have seen in the 1980's. The 4.2 
percent surplus levels were deemed reasonable through that period, an:l price 
prevailed as the manager of supply. 
Of course, we are much closer again to having price manage supply-demand 
than we are to adopting an overt supply management p?'OQram. The Dairy and 
Tobacco Act of 1983 initiated the schedule of l~r support prices we are now 
caught up in, dropping the level fran $13.10 to $12.60 on December 1, 1983, and 
moving the industry tc:Mard the $11.10 that will be in place October 1 of this 
year. Price is currently in the driver's seat in terms of managing supplies. 
But we are not here to talk about price. SUpply management has already 
been defined as not including price as a production control measure. 
SUpply management can take one of two basic forms - it can be voluntary, 
or it can be mandatory. 
Voluntary supply management is a production control program that carries 
an INCENTIVE to participate. 
Mandatory supply management is a production control program that carries a 
PENALTY if you don't canply. 
Too often, we confuse these two vastly different approaches. We have all 
seen proposals in the past two or three years, for example, that are described 
as being voluntary but carry substantial penalties for failure to canply. 
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Proponents of such proposals recognize that it is much easier to sell a program 
billed as being voluntary as compared to one billed as being mandatory. 
It is relevant to suggest that voluntary supply management is a cure - it 
cures surplus milk by renK>Ving current prcxiuction capacity. Marx:latory supply 
management is a prevention - it prevents the prcxiuction of excess milk. 
Whether an ounce of prevention is worth a p:::rurd of cure or not is obviously a 
substantial debate in the milk industry. 
We are here this morning to discuss mandatory supply management. But 
first we need to acknoW'ledge the kinds of dairy supply management P?'OJX'alllS we 
have experienced in this country. 
1. We have never had a national mandatory supply management program for 
milk in the United States. 
2. We are currently ?;lasing out of the third national voluntary supply 
management program we have had in history. All three of these programs have 
cane into place in the past four years as various means of coping with the 
runaway surplus were advanced. 
a. The 50 cent rebate program, or second 50 cents, was in place for 
only three months in late 1983 (September - November). Dairy farmers reducing 
production by at least 8.4 percent fran their 1981-82 base got a 50 cent per 
cwt. refund on all milk marketed. The program was so short-lived that it had 
very little impact. 
b. The Diversion Program, that lasted for 15 months in 1984 and early 
1985, was the second voluntary supply management program. The incentive to 
participate was $10 per cwt. for milk that was not marketed, i.e., diverted in 
the amount of 5-30 percent below their 1981-82 base. Approximately 20 percent 
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(37,888) of the nation's ccmnercial dairy farmers participated in the diversion 
pi::'OQram. 
c. The Dairy Termination Program, or Whole Herd Buyout program is the 
third, ~-_Q_~Qab_ly_nqt; __ ~--1~1;, implementation of voluntary ~ly 
management. '!his 18 month program, which started April 1, 1986 is in its final 
stages. A total of 39,534 dairy farmers in the U.S. sul:mitted price bids on a 
per cwt. basis in relation to their 1984-8~ base marketings. The number of 
dairy farmers that sul:Jnitted acceptable bids ($22.!50 per cwt. or less) totalled 
13,988. 
When we talk about supply management, it is important that we recognize 
these voluntary supply management programs because we may see a lot more of 
them in the future and never see a mandatory supply management prog1oam. 
Sane of the reasons why voluntary supply management programs loan as 
important considerations include: 
1. The programs have generally been recognized as having achieved 
their purposes, at least in the short run. 
2. The progr:mns can be partially or fully financed by assessments on 
milk producers. 
3. Dairy farmers and the public (excluding cattlemen) seem to score 
the programs as being acceptable. 
Also, we should not forget that the Food Security Act of 1985 states that 
"the Secretary ~yestablish and carry out a milk diversion or milk production 
termination program for ~ of the calerdar years 1988, 1989, and 1990 as 
necessary" to avoid 'rurdensane excess supplies. 
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Voluntary supply management programs do not have to be short term, 
although thus far they have been designed that way. 
There are other kinds of base plans in milk. Let me acknowledge, and 
dismiss, them quickly because they do not get at the purposes of national 
supply management. 
1. Nine of the 43 Federal milk order markets currently utilize base-excess 
plans. '1'hese plans are designed exclusively to iron out seasonality; they have 
moving bases; and excess milk is not subject to ~ significant penalty. 
2. Class I base plans in Federal order markets are a matter of history. 
Authority for their implementation was not re-newed in 1981 Farm Act. Only two 
markets ever adopted Class I base plans. The plans were not production control 
plans; they only distriruted pool money in relation to a Class I base. 
3. A very few States - california, Virginia, and Oregan cane to mind -
operate base plans through their State milk agencies. These base plans are not 
supply management plans. OVer base milk is priced at the manufacturing milk 
price, and that cannot be considered a penalty price. State base plans are 
primarily a means of assuring an individual milk producer his share of the 
Class I market. 
4. Occasionally we hear reference to dairy cooperative base plans. It 
is a very unusual market situation that pe:nnits a cooperative to operate a base 
plan. Cooperatives are voluntary organizations, and when a cooperative adopts 
a base plan that has ~ discipline to it, a membership or non-member problem 
is certain to develop. Furthe:noore, most effective dairy marketing 
cooperatives have their own manufacturing facilities, and they have a vested 
interest in running milk through their plants. 
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Why are we interested in national mandatory supply management? There is 
widespread agreement that an absolute propensity to produce milk at lCM costs 
and beyond market demand in the long run exists in the dairy irxiustry. I think 
it's fair to observe that the steam behind the supply management school canes 
out of a fear of a current an:i a yet to be implemented technology in milk 
production. We are afraid of the future and of what these milk cows are going 
to be able to do. Production per CCM has tripled since World War II, and we 
are looking at alroost another doubling by the turn of the century. 
In their March, 1986 report, the Office of Technology Assessment 
stated, "The roost dramatic impacts [of emerging technologies) will be felt 
first in the dairy industry .•.• New technologies adopted by the dairy industry 
will increase milk production per cow far beyo.00 the 2.6 percent annual growth 
rate of the past 20 years. UIX3.er OTA's most likely conditions, milk production 
per cow is expected to increase from current levels to at least 24,000 pounds 
by the year 2, 000, an anrrual growth rate of 3. 9 percent" [ 1] • 
If one is ready to accept these kinds of projections, then supply 
management has to be considered a serious alternative. At the present time, it 
requires a net Mdu.ction of 104,000 milk cows n the United States to offset 
every 1 percent increase in production per cCM. A reduction of 104,000 milk 
cows, assuming an average dairy herd of 65 milking cows in the U.S. at present, 
means the required exit of 1,600 dairy farmers (assumes constant demand). When 
crrA talks about a 3.9 percent increase each year in production per cCM, one can 
see how quickly the pressure on survival of the family dairy farm multiplies. 
Are we ready to accept the social-structural chan,;1es that those numbers 
suggest? Conclusions in the OTA study are that price S\JRX)rt policies that 
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reflect the schedule of the dairy title of the Food Security Act of 1985 would 
work against survival of the family dairy farm. The specific contrast is as 
follCMS: 
(1) A 52 cow dairy farm in Minnesota has only a 74 percent probability of 
survival through the 1983 - 1992 pericxi with present policies. 
( 2) With mandatory supply management, the survival probability for that 
same dairy farm would increase to 92 percent. 
Since three-fourths of the dairy farms in the United States fit the 52 cow 
herd size model pretty well, it's not difficult to perceive the attraction that 
supply management is going to continue to hold for the milk industry. 
~ly_~t_Ql:>j~t~~ 
SUpply management, by definition, means that the milk industry is choosing 
an objective of price enhancement - of establishing producer milk prices 
significantly higher than long run market clearing prices. If this were not 
the case, then we would not have to concern ourselves with production controls. 
It's reasonable to state that the canprehensive objective of supply management 
is to return prices to milk producers at levels high enough to pennit "average" 
dairy farmers to enjoy a satisfactory level of living, while avoiding the 
production of excess milk supplies. 
The 1977 Farm Act, with its 80 percent of parity stipulations, gave the 
milk industry price enhancement without production controls; leading us into 
the 8, 10, and 12 percent surpluses we have been burdened with in the 1980's. 
Historically, the purpose of the price support program was to provide dairy 
farmers a support price in the short run, but one that would only be at "safety 
net" levels over the long run. Sane people call that the market oriented 
school. We have learned our lesson. If we want price enhancement in our price 
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supp:>rt program, then we must come up with an acceptable an::l effective supply 
management program. 
Sgpp,ly ~t -:. l?r9s .. ~ ~ 
It is difficult to evaluate mandatory supply management in general terms 
because the specific provisions of a supply management program can have a major 
impact on the various effects of the program. For example, if bases are 
transferable, the effects are much different than if they are not transferable. 
Or, if feed grains are also subject to supply management, the impact on the 
dairy sector will be substantially different than if feed grains are not 
subject to supply management, especially as dairy farmers that purchase most of 
their feed are affected relative to those that grow most of their feed. 
The essential elements of a mandatory supply management program include -
(1) Assignment of a base to each producer, geared to marketings in a 
recent production period. 
(2) Assignment of an armual quota to each producer as a percentage of 
base, established at a level that w:mld achieve national supply - demand 
balance. 
(3) Establishment of an enhanced price for quota milk, developed by a 
procedure such as a dairy parity formula or sane other price mover. 
(4) Establishment of a penalty price for over-quota milk, at a level 
that would be lower than variable costs of milk production, an::l probably low 
enough to penni t exports of products made fran over-quota milk to move into the 
world market without subsidy. 
With that picture of a supply management program as a starter, some pro-
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con ideas with respect to seven basic effects of supply management can be 
advanced. 
1 . J:>rice-<J:nc~ F;ffects 
There are no quick and simple answers to the question of what the 
price-incane effects of mandatory supply management add up to. SUpply 
management is grounded in the econanic principle that the demand for dairy 
products, especially fluid milk products, is very price inelastic. Therefore, 
a shift in the supply curve to the left, through a production control program, 
can mean higher prices and greater total revenue at the dairy farm. 
We often look to canada/Ontario for evidence to help evaluate what 
mandatory supply management would accanplish in the United States. It is 
probably the best working model we can look to. But canparisons cannot be made 
strictly because (1) it is unlikely that the United States would ever turn over 
to producer milk marketing boards the powers - price, quotas, license, etc. -
that have been assigned in canada, and (2) the Canadian milk industry, 
especially in Ontario and Quebec where 74 percent of canada's milk is produced, 
have a different history, structure, and technological base as canpared to the 
United States. But it is inevitable that we do look to the Canadian situation, 
especially since the milk producers of Canada are highly supportive of their 
supply management approach. 
Producer milk prices, without question, can be enhanced with supply 
management. A recent Michigan State University report indicated that while 
milk prices in the U.S. have been eroding in the 1980's, producer prices in 
Canada have been moving upward ($12.15 cwt in Michigan in 1985 versus 
$14.91/cwt. in Ontario) [2]. Without supply management, the same supply driven 
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pressures CXl milk prices that we have seen in the United States since 1981 
would have occurred in canada. 
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Impacts of supply management on producer incane are subject to a 
large extent to the rules of the plan. Base transferability is the key 
consideration. The average Ontario dairy farm, 43 milk cows, had quota value 
estimated at $153,000 in 1985. Quotas take on substantial values because they 
represent a privilege to market milk and to receive a significantly higher 
price for the quota amomlt of milk. The value of quota therefore becanes an 
asset in the balance sheet and an additional cost in the schedule of production 
costs. Volume constraints of the quota may also place the dairy farmer in the 
position of having excess capacity in various inputs to the point that net farm 
incane is reduced. In camnenting on the strengths of Ontario's program, the 
only reference to price - incane impacts that Loren Hurd of the CJ+iB has made 
are that, "The plan put individual producers in a position, for the first time, 
where the returns they received fran the market could not be jeopardized by the 
amomlts of milk marketed by other producers, either within a province or 
nationally" [3]. The implication is that direct price - incane effects have 
been relatiely limited. 
2. SUrplus Milk 
The observation of Loren Hurd on protecting an individual's 
marketing position fran other milk producers canes very close to how we view 
Class I base plans and State base plans. In national mandatory supply 
management, surplus can be geared fran zero to any amount you might want. 
canada has experienced surpluses of less than 1 percent annually in recent 
years. That canpa.res with U.S. surpluses that averaged 9 percent of annual 
milk marketings in the 1980-1986 period, even as we fiddled with voluntary 
supply management programs. Prices for over-quota milk that are at such low 
levels that they represent substantial losses for over-quota production can 
balance supply am. demand quickly. The direct public cost of a dairy price 
support program, which has hovered in the $2 billion a year range in this 
country in recent years, can be reduced to zero by not having surplus to 
purchase am. by having in-quota levies that address the problem of higher 
surpluses of SNF compared to butterfat. 
3. Commercial Demand 
The demand for milk and dairy products responds to changes in 
price, rut it is an inelastic response. r.t:>st researchers have estimated 
sanething around - 0.2 for fluid milk products and - 0.8 for manufactured dairy 
products. Milk prices can be increased with a proportionately smaller effect 
on quantity demanded. 
Camnercial demand for milk and dairy products in the U.S. jumped 
fran 122.5 billion pounds in 1983 to an estimated 137.0 billion pounds in 1987, 
plus 10 percent in just four years. Demand has increased in a time of lower 
producer prices and lower real consumer prices for milk and dairy products. 
The 15 cent per cwt. generic pranotion program may have had saitething to do 
with it, rut the first ~ annual reports of the National Dairy Board have not 
been able to evidence any pranotion-demand causal relationship. 
We went through almost ~ generations of declining demand for 
milk and dairy products, and all of us got pessimistic about the long tenn 
market. But a major turnaround has occurred. NCM there is sane uncertainty 
about affectil'Y:1 the strong demand situation with a high price program. The ~ 
significant cOJJlllOd.ities in the United States that have mamatory supply 
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management, pearruts am tobacco, are in decli~ market siruations. Other 
factors than high quota prices may explain the peanuts-tobacco situations, but 
the high prices cannot be dismissed. Will demand for milk and dairy products 
be adversely affected by high quota prices? Absolutely. Should the estimated 
effects on demand preclude us fran making further inquires into supply 
management? Probably not. 
~+y_~ 
Saving the family farm is at least an implicit and probably an explicit 
objective of mandatory supply management. In fact, the name of the Harkin-
Gephardt bill in Congress is the "Save the Family Farm" bill. But mandatory 
supply management does not necessarily stop or even slow down the trend toward 
greater concentration in milk production. As the canadian experience 
indicates, with base transfer, there are simultaneous incentives to exit and to 
expand. Cropp and Jesse refer to this as the push and pull influence (4]. 
Note the relative changes in dairy farm numbers in canada and the U.S. in 
recent years. 
Dairy Farm Numbers, canada and United States 
Year ~ Uni teq_§_tat~ 
1975/76 79,833 Farms 422,000 Farms 
1984/85 44,629 273,600 
In the recent decade, the number of farms with milk cows in the United 
States, without supply management, decreased by 35 percent; the number of farms 
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selling milk to processing plants in canada, with supply management, declined 
by 44 percent. 
The base transfer provision "pushes" sane producers to get larger by 
purchasing more quota, and "pulls" other producers out of dairying as they 
capitalize on the sole of their quota. 
Cornell University research has also shcMn that mandatory supply 
management that also extends to feed grains would leave milk producers who buy 
most of their feed "N:>rse off as canpared to present policy [5]. 
So mandatory supply management is not.by definition a device that will 
save the family dairy farm. Base transfer does not have to be handled like it 
is in canada. The government could hold title to all quota and could make all 
quota assignments. How to handle base transfer canes down to what you want the 
production control program to do. What is the objective? 
~!;lgp.___1,:fti.-9:!~ 
Many of the concerns about mandatory supply management cane down to its 
impact on production efficiency. Again, the rules for base transfer enter the 
discussion. If bases are transferable, most of the questions concerning milk 
production efficiency and econanic resource allocation are resolved. It is 
true that production per cow in canada lags about 25 percent below the almost 
13,600 pound level we will reach in the United States this year, but the supply 
management program is not a factor in that lag. 
Knadng that the amount of milk they can market at a quota price is fixed, 
milk producers would shift their decision-making eqilasis fran that of growth 
and expansion to that of cost minimization for the quantity they can market. 
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Of course, they would be keeping constant track of the buy quota-sell quota 
p:>ssibilities. 
If bases are not transferable, the efficiency questions becane more 
critical. Higher cost producers would have very little incentive to exit fran 
dairying and, in effect, would be subsidized by the higher quota price. 
Adoption of new technology would be slowed ai¥i the entire irxiustry would be 
less canpetitive. The burden of fine tuning the quota program - ~ gets quota 
- wheI'e should quota be assigned - in ways that would invite progress and 
efficiency would be in the hands of government. 
~j,ey -~~ti'Vf!!S 
Milk marketing cooperatives have been at the forefront of lobbying for 
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dairy price support programs that would benefit their members. But mandatory 
supply management poses sane new questions. Dairy cooperatives would have to 
get used to the idea that they can no lOIYJE!r set prices. SUper-pools would 
disappear. The quota price and the over-quota price would becane the prices. 
It would not be acceptable to permit dairy cooperatives to bargain for higher 
prices in a market which had been shortened by a mandatory control program. In 
effect, mandatory supply management means that the government prices are not 
only minimums rut are also maximums. 
Also, dairy cooperatives have built milk manufacturing facilities on a 
large scale over the years to undergird their bargaining purposes and to 
guarantee their members a mark.et. When the manufacturing facilities are 
running near capacity, which is the case in pericxis of excess milk supply, the 
cooperatives are into profit making situations. Any program designed to 
shorten milk supplies hurts the cooperatives ard therefore the farmer members 
who own the facilities. 
In Canada, the Ontario Milk Marketing Board has becane a kind of super-
cooperative. In a sense, existing cooperatives lose much of their reason to be 
- bargaining, guaranteeing a market, assembly of milk, etc. In the end, many 
dairy cooperatives would back off fran supporting man::latory supply management. 
M!!!c ~~t:~on Rf:!g,icms; 
For more than thirty years, fran its inauguration in 1949, the dairy price 
support program operated as a national program, and there were basically no 
regional criticisms or regional differences that challenged the program. This 
is true because the direct effects of the program were on price, ard all 
!'~Q[J§_J;l~ _t:J::~ c;QUn!;:y __ ~~j~_t:~--~--P!';j,~---~J'_~_ect: on their milk used for 
manufacturing and on their basic formula price. 
This was true even though most camnodity Credit Corporation purchase 
activity occurred in only four States. In 1985-86, the four States where most 
product was acquired were, in order, california, Minnesota, Wisconsin, ard 
washington. In 1985-86, 61 percent of the butter, 69 percent of the cheese, 
ard 57 percent of the nonfat dry milk were purchased fran firms located in 
those States. 
Now that production controls have been introduced to the milk industry in 
the recent voluntary supply management efforts, regionalization has emerged. 
It doesn't make sense to apply uniform cutbacks in milk production across the 
nation when there ~d be limited impact in sane surplus areas and severe 
shortages in sane deficit areas. SUpply management,and especially mandatory 
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supply management, will have to reflect sane regional differentiation in its 
implementation. 
?~.~~ 
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sane of the intense interest in supply management that existed a year ago 
has moved to the backburner. This is true 1n part because the whole herd 
buyout program has removed sane of the visibility of surplus milk fran the 
picture. M:>st of the current discussions on legislative proposals have to do 
with cancelling price support drops. But I expect that as milk production 
builds again as the whole herd buyout impact fades, interest in suwly 
management will came back accordingly. The primary efforts will be directed at 
getting another voluntary program into operation as authorized by the 1985 Farm 
Act. 
Mandatory supply management is well out into the future. General 
agreement for such an approach across the milk producer sector does not now 
exist. We are going to have to see the full impacts of biotechnology on 
production per CCM a decade hence before serious developnent of the mandatory 
approach occurs. 
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